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We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium,
an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Speciﬁcally, we examine the conditions
under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private third–party
recommendations drawn from publicly–announced distributions. We ﬁnd that when recommendations
are not given to subjects, aggregate behavior is characterized well by mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium
play, though it does less well at lower levels of aggregation. When recommendations are given, behavior
diﬀers from both mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium and behavior without recommendations, with the
nature of the diﬀerences varying according to the treatment. Our main ﬁnding is that subjects will follow
third–party recommendations only if those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium, and
further, if that correlated equilibrium is payoﬀ–enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.
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A standard assumption in noncooperative game theory is that players’ strategies—whether pure or mixed—
are probabilistically independent. However, researchers at least as long ago as Aumann (1974, 1987)
recognized that relaxing this assumption by allowing correlation in players’ strategies could greatly enlarge
a game’s equilibrium possibilities beyond the set of Nash equilibria. The equilibria that result are known
as correlated equilibria.1 As an illustration, consider the two–player game of Chicken, shown in Figure 1;
strategies are defect (D) and cooperate (C). This game has two asymmetric pure–strategy Nash equilibria—




Player D 0,0 9,3
1 C 3,9 7,7
Figure 1: The basic Chicken game
The mixed–strategy equilibrium of this game has the attractive feature of symmetry—thus avoiding
the “symmetry–breaking” question implicit in asymmetric equilibria (see Crawford (1998)). Evolutionary
dynamics often favor such symmetry and indeed, the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy is the unique
evolutionarily stable strategy of this game (see, for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)). However,
as Skyrms (1996) and others have observed, this mixed–strategy equilibrium is ineﬃcient: in the Chicken
game of Figure 1, it yields expected payoﬀs of just 5.4 for each player. By contrast, if the players somehow
agreed to condition their behavior on a fair coin toss, playing (for example) the strategy proﬁle (D,C) after
Heads and (C,D) after Tails, each could improve her ex ante expected payoﬀ to 6. Moreover, since both
recommended outcomes are strict Nash equilibria, both would strictly prefer to honor such an agreement
as long as they believed that the other would, even after knowing which recommendation was received.2
Furthermore, as Aumann (1974) ﬁrst pointed out, the players could actually do even better in this
game by enlisting an “objective chance mechanism”, that randomly chooses one of three signals called (for
example) “X”, “Y”, and “Z”, with equal probability. Player 1 learns only whether X was chosen or not
while Player 2 learns only whether Z was chosen or not. Aumann then shows that if both players know the
set and distribution of signals (possible states of the world), and if Player 1 plays strategy D if the state
is “X” and C otherwise, while Player 2 plays strategy D if the state is “Z” and C otherwise, that these
correlated strategies are mutual best responses, i.e., a correlated equilibrium that yields expected payoﬀs of
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3 to each player in the Chicken game of Figure 1—an expected payoﬀ that is higher than that obtained
under the mixed–strategy equilibrium.3
1An early example of a correlated equilibrium is also found in Luce and Raiﬀa (1957, pp. 115-120).
2By contrast, see Young (2005, Chapter 3) for a discussion of a variant on this setup (due to Moulin and Vial (1978))
in which players choose—before receiving recommendations—whether to commit to following them or not. Young calls a
distribution of recommendations under this setup a coarse correlated equilibrium if all players are willing to commit to
following recommendations, given that the others also choose to commit.
3The objective chance mechanism induces the outcomes (D,C), (C,C) and (C,D) with equal (one–third) probability, so
expected payoﬀs are (3 + 7 + 9)/3 for each player.
1A correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution over outcomes—that is, a joint distribution over
players’ strategies—such that under the assumptions mentioned above, all players prefer to follow their
state–contingent correlated strategy. Then, a Nash equilibrium is just a special case of correlated equilib-
rium, in which the joint distribution of strategies is the product of the corresponding marginals (that is,
the resulting players’ strategies are probabilistically independent of one another).
Aumann (1987) argued that correlated equilibria follow naturally from a “modern subjectivist, Bayesian
view of the world” (p. 2)—that is, when all events can be assigned subjective probabilities and individuals
are Bayesian–rational. Indeed, he shows that if players are Bayesian–rational and hold common priors
concerning the probability distribution of observations from the randomization device, then the distribution
of actions chosen by those players must be a correlated equilibrium distribution. As Aumann observes,
while correlated equilibria and mixed equilibria both rely on observations from a randomization device,
correlated strategies (and thus correlated equilibria) are more general as there is no need to assume that
the observations from the randomization device are independent of one another, as is assumed under mixed
strategies.
On the other hand, Gul (1988) has argued that Aumann’s argument for the naturalness of correlated
equilibria relies heavily on the assumption of common prior beliefs, which is not so easily justiﬁed. Gul
argues instead that common priors should be explicitly modeled as having been achieved based on some
prior stage of the game. One possibility is that players have learned over time to hold such common beliefs
as in the work of Hart and Mas-Colell (2002) and others.4 A second possibility is to adopt Myerson’s
(1991, p. 250) mechanism–design approach where, in a ﬁrst stage, a neutral third-party “mediator” (which
Myerson describes as “a person or machine that can help the players communicate and share information”)
draws outcomes for all players from a commonly known distribution, thus ensuring common prior beliefs.
For instance, the mediator might announce to players that he will draw each of the three Chicken game
outcomes (D,C), (C,C), and (C,D) with equal probability. The mediator then recommends to each player
only the player’s own strategy for the outcome chosen—not that of the other player (e.g., if the outcome
randomly drawn is (C,D), the mediator privately recommends to Player 1 that she play C and privately
recommends to Player 2 that he play D). In the second stage, players may choose actions conditional on
the recommendation given to them by the mediator. This latter approach is perhaps the one that is best
suited to the laboratory, as the experimenter can announce the distribution of outcomes used publicly
thereby assuring common priors, and the experimenter can also play the role of the neutral, third–party
mediator. This recommended–play approach has the added advantage of yielding a clearer mapping from
realizations of the randomization device to each player’s strategy space. This is the approach we take in
this paper.5
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical validity of the correlated equilibrium concept
with an external mediator. We study correlated equilibria in the controlled environment of the laboratory,
as this enables us to clearly assess the role of well–deﬁned, correlated signals as coordinating devices,
providing the theory with its best chance of success. Speciﬁcally, we design and conduct an experiment in
which human subjects play the game shown in Figure 1. Prior to making their choices, subjects receive
4See, e.g., Foster and Vohra (1997), Fudenberg and Levine (1998 Chapter 8, 1999), Vanderschraaf (2001), Vanderschraaf
and Skyrms (2003), and Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008).
5Sharma and Torres (2004) provide a model of how such a neutral, third-party mediator could play a welfare–improving
role in implementing correlated equilibria in a team production model.
2private signals (“recommendations”) generated according to a known distribution of outcomes that serves
as our main treatment variable. Three of the distributions we use are symmetric correlated equilibria. In
one of our treatments, which we call our “Nash–recommendations” treatment, the correlated equilibrium
we attempt to implement is simply a convex combination of Nash equilibria. In a second treatment—our
“good–recommendations” treatment—the correlated equilibrium is the one described above, which yields
payoﬀs that are Pareto superior to all symmetric payoﬀ vectors in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium
payoﬀ vectors.
It is often forgotten, though, that there also exist correlated equilibria in which payoﬀs are Pareto
inferior to all symmetric payoﬀ vectors in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors. If correlated
equilibrium is to be taken seriouslyas a descriptive device, and not just a theoretical curiosity, then it should
be possible to induce these bad correlated equilibria as well as the good ones. To our knowledge, however,
there has never been an experimental test of a bad correlated equilibrium. We remedy this, with what we
call our “bad–recommendations” treatment. Despite the “bad” moniker, the distribution over outcomes
we use in this treatment is every bit as much a correlated equilibrium as that in our good– and Nash–
recommendations treatments. In particular, it is still optimal for a player to follow her recommendations,
as long as she believes her opponent will follow the recommendations given him.
Finally, we attempt to distinguish between subjects’ following recommendations as part of a correlated
equilibrium and their following of recommendations for other reasons—for example, out of a desire to please
the experimenter (an example of “experimenter demand eﬀects”)—withour “very–good–recommendations”
treatment. In this treatment, the distributionof recommended outcomes is not a correlated equilibrium, but
the temptation to follow recommendations may be great, because if both players follow recommendations,
payoﬀs are Pareto superior to all symmetric correlated–equilibrium payoﬀ vectors.
In the experiment, subjects play the game shown in Figure 1 repeatedly against changing opponents.
In half of the rounds, they receive recommendations (always according to the same correlated strategy
distribution), while in the remaining rounds, they do not receive any recommendations. The main results
are as follows. When players do not receive recommendations, their behavior is described fairly well
(though not perfectly) by the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. Giving subjects recommendations has an
eﬀect that depends on which underlying distribution of outcomes is used. The likelihood of following a
recommendation is higher in the good– and Nash–recommendations treatments and lower in the bad– and
very–good–recommendations treatments, and also varies somewhat with which of the available actions is
recommended. In nearly all cases, subjects follow recommendations more often than chance would predict,
but there is no treatment where subjects follow recommendations all the time.
2 Correlated equilibrium—theory and tests
The game we use is the Chicken game shown in Figure 1 above. We chose Chicken as it is perhaps the
simplest game with the property that there exist correlated equilibrium payoﬀ pairs that lie outside the
convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pairs. Under the assumption that players are risk neutral with
regard to monetary payoﬀs, the game has three Nash equilibria: (D,C), (C,D), and a mixed–strategy
Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses D with probability 2
5. Payoﬀs in these three equilibria are,
respectively, (9,3), (3,9), and (5.4,5.4).
As mentioned in the introduction, one way to think about correlated equilibria is as involving a
3“mediator”—a non–strategic third party—in the game. The mediator chooses one of the four pure–strategy
proﬁles according to a commonly–known probability distribution, and to each player “recommends” that
player’s component in the proﬁle. (The mediator never recommends a mixed strategy.) The probability
distribution is a correlated equilibrium of the original game if each player at least weakly prefers following
her recommended action to choosing any other action. (Thus, a correlated equilibrium of the original
game corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of this new game, in which players’ strategies are mappings from
recommended actions to chosen actions.6)
Deﬁne pDD, pDC, pCD, and pCC to be the probabilities of the outcomes (D,D), (D,C), (C,D), and
(C,C), according to the commonly–known distribution characterizing the mediator’s behavior. Suppose
Player 1 is given a recommendation of D. Then, the conditional probability that the chosen outcome was
(D,D) is
pDD
pDD+pDC, and the probability that the chosen outcome was (D,C) is
pDC
pDD+pDC. If Player 1 believes
that Player 2 will follow the recommendation given to him, then Player 1’s conditional expected payoﬀ
























pDD+pDC —that is, if
2pDC ≥ 3pDD. Using similar reasoning for Player 1 following a C recommendation, Player 2 following an





A correlated equilibrium is a quadruple (pDD,pDC,pCD,pCC) that satisﬁes these four inequalities, along
with pDD + pDC + pCD + pCC = 1.
Since the set of correlated equilibria can be characterized as an intersection of sets deﬁned by linear
equations and inequalities, it is a convex set, and because it contains the set of Nash equilibria, it must
also contain the convex hull of Nash equilibria. The same is true in payoﬀ space; that is, the set of
correlated–equilibrium payoﬀs of a game always contains the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibrium
payoﬀ pairs. However, in most games—including ours—there also exist correlated equilibria that are not
in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pairs. Figure 2 shows the regions corresponding to the sets of
Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pairs and correlated equilibrium payoﬀ pairs. The Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pairs of
this game are (3,9) (corresponding to the equilibrium (C,D)), (9,3) (corresponding to (D,C)), and (5.4,5.4)
(corresponding to the mixed–strategy equilibrium). Therefore, the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ
6This Nash equilibrium is not unique. There always exist three “babbling” equilibria corresponding to the three Nash
equilibria of the original game, in which both players completely ignore the recommendations given them, and play Nash
equilibrium strategies instead. There exist additional equilibria as well.














































































































































































pairs is the triangle with these three points as vertices (region A in the ﬁgure); in particular, 6 is the
highest symmetric payoﬀ in this convex hull, and 5.4 the lowest. The set of correlated equilibrium payoﬀ
pairs is the quadrilateral with vertices (3,9), (4.5,4.5), (9,3), and (63
7,63
7) (the union of regions A, Bl, and
Bh in the ﬁgure), so that 63
7 is the highest symmetric correlated equilibrium payoﬀ and 4.5 the lowest.
Relatively little experimental research has looked at correlated equilibria that are not convex combi-
nations of Nash equilibria.7 The earliest such study that we know of is that by Moreno and Wooders
(1998), who examine the ability of several game–theoretic solution concepts (including Nash equilibrium
and correlated equilibrium) to characterize subject behavior in a three–player version of a one–shot match-
ing pennies game, in which two of the players have perfectly aligned interests; their game is shown on the
left of Figure 3. Instead of giving players recommendations as we do, they allowed subjects to participate
in a round of cheap talk prior to play of the game; subjects could send messages to either other player
individually, or to both at once. Moreno and Wooders found that the choices of the players with aligned
interests were highly correlated, so that mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium poorly described the distribu-
tion of outcomes. Rather, they concluded that the best–performing solution concept was coalition–proof
correlated equilibrium (Einy and Peleg (1995), Moreno and Wooders (1996)).
More recently, Cason and Sharma (2007) attempted to induce a correlated equilibrium through the
7Experimental studies of correlated equilibria that are convex combinations of Nash equilibrium include Van Huyck, Gilette,
and Battalio (1992), Brandts and McLeod (1995), and Seely, Van Huyck, and Battalio (2005). In a market setting, Duﬀy and
Fisher (2005) examine whether subjects will coordinate on the closely related concept of a sunspot equilibrium involving a
randomization over two certainty equilibria.
5use of private recommendations to subjects, as we do. The game they use is a version of Chicken, shown
on the right of Figure 3. The correlated equilibrium they attempt to induce has (Up, Right) and (Down,
Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
H T H T Left Right
Player H 1,1,–2 –1,–1,2 Player H –1,–1,2 –1,–1,2 Player Up 3,3 48,9
1 T –1,–1,2 –1,–1,2 1 T –1,–1,2 1,1,–2 1 Down 9,48 39,39
Player 3: H Player 3: T
Moreno and Wooders (1998) Cason and Sharma (2007)
Figure 3: Games used in previous correlated–equilibrium experiments
Left) occurring with probability 0.375 each, and (Down, Right) with probability 0.25, with (Up, Left)
never occurring. This correlated equilibrium yields expected payoﬀs of 31.125 for each player: higher than
the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium expected payoﬀs of 20.4, and indeed, higher than any symmetric
payoﬀ pair in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium expected payoﬀs. In the experiment, subjects often did
follow recommendations, doing so roughly 80% of the time in their baseline treatment, and earning payoﬀs
well above the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium prediction (though below the prediction of the correlated
equilibrium) as a result.8
However, by only considering a correlated equilibrium that was payoﬀ–enhancing relative to Nash equi-
librium, Cason and Sharma’s study risks confounding the coordinating role of third-party recommendations
with a general interest by subjects in earning higher payoﬀs. Further, in Cason and Sharma’s experimental
instructions, they explicitly tell subjects that they ought to follow recommendations, as doing so will result
in higher payoﬀs as long as the opposing player also follows recommendations.9
By contrast with Cason and Sharma’s (2007) experiment, which considered a single type of correlated
equilibrium, our experimental design considers three diﬀerent correlated equilibria, each associated with a
diﬀerent probability distribution for recommended play. In our “Nash–recommendations” treatment, the
recommendations (D,C) and (C,D) are each selected with probability one–half, and (C,C) and (D,D)
are selected with probability zero. This distribution of recommended outcomes is a correlated equilibrium,
and moreover, is a convex combination of Nash equilibria, with payoﬀs of 6 for each player. We also
consider two correlated equilibria that are not convex combinations of Nash equilibria. In our “good–
recommendations” treatment, the recommended outcomes (D,C), (C,D), and (C,C) are each selected
with probability one–third, and (D,D) is selected with probability zero. These probabilities satisfy the
conditions for a correlated equilibrium, and yield payoﬀs of 61
3 for each player—more than any point in the
convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ pairs. In addition to the good–recommendationstreatment, however,
8Cason and Sharma—somewhat pessimistically, in our opinion—conclude from these results that “players frequently reject
recommendations,” and their experiment includes additional treatments designed to increase the likelihood that recommen-
dations are followed, such as having human subjects play against a computer program that always follows recommendations.
Recommendations are typically followed even more often in these variations.
9For example, their instructions state “[y]ou should follow the recommendation given by the computer, because as long
as the person you are paired with also follows his or her recommendation then you earn more on average by following the
recommendation” and “[t]o reiterate: you always earn more by following your recommendation as long as the participant you
are paired with also follows his or her recommendation”; see http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/cason/papers/corr-
inst.pdf.
6we also consider a “bad–recommendations” treatment, in which the recommended outcomes (D,C) and
(C,D) are each selected with probability 0.4, and (D,D) is selected with probability 0.2, so that (C,C) is
selected with probability zero. These probabilities also satisfy the conditions for a correlated equilibrium,
but result in payoﬀs of only 4.8 for each player—less than any point in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium
payoﬀ pairs. As far as we know, there are no existing experimental studies of correlated equilibria that are
payoﬀ–reducing relative to Nash equilibrium.
Finally, as an even stronger test of the correlated equilibrium concept, we consider one distribution
of recommended outcomes that is not a correlated equilibrium. In our “very–good–recommendations”
treatment, the recommended outcome (C,C) is selected with probability 0.8, (D,C) and (C,D) are each
selected with probability 0.1, and (D,D) is selected with probability zero. Given these probabilities, a
player receiving a D recommendation will prefer to follow it—assuming she believes her opponent will also
follow recommendations—but a player receiving a C recommendation will not, instead preferring to choose
D. If recommendations are followed, however, payoﬀs are 6.8 for each player—higher than in any of three
correlated equilibria discussed above.
Some features of the four recommended outcome distributions we use, as well as the mixed–strategy
Nash equilibrium, are shown in Table 1. The expected payoﬀs from following these distributions of recom-
mended outcomes are also shown in Figure 2 (as plus signs).
Table 1: Outcome frequencies imposed in the experiment
Probability Probability Probability Probability Probability Expected
of (D,D) of (D,C) of (C,D) of (C,C) of C choice payoﬀs
outcome outcome outcome outcome
Good recommendations 0.000 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.667 (6.333,6.333)
Bad recommendations 0.200 0.400 0.400 0.000 0.400 (4.8,4.8)
Nash recommendations 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 (6,6)
Very good recommendations 0.000 0.100 0.100 0.800 0.900 (6.8,6.8)
Mixed–strategy NE 0.160 0.240 0.240 0.360 0.600 (5.4,5.4)
3 Experimental procedures
Besides varying the type of recommendations that were given to subjects (that is, the probability distri-
bution over outcomes), we varied whether recommendations were given at all. All experimental sessions
lasted for 40 rounds: 20 rounds with recommendations and 20 rounds without recommendations. We also
varied the order of these; in half of our sessions, the 20 rounds without recommendations came ﬁrst, and
in the other half, the 20 rounds with recommendations came ﬁrst. (Thus, whether or not recommenda-
tions were given was varied within–subject, while the type of recommendations and the ordering between
recommendations and no recommendations were varied between–subjects.) Each experimental session in-
volved 12 subjects. Subjects were primarily undergraduate students from University of Pittsburgh, and
were recruited by newspaper advertisements and email. No one took part in more than one session of this
experiment.
7At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated in a single room and given a set of writteninstructions
for the ﬁrst twenty rounds.10 They were told at this time that there would be a second part to the session,
but details of the second part were not announced until after the ﬁrst part had ended. The instructions for
the ﬁrst part were read aloud to subjects, in an attempt to make the rules of the game common knowledge.
After the instructions were read, subjects were given a short quiz to ensure that they understood the
instructions. After subjects’ quizzes were completed, they were graded anonymously. If any question was
answered incorrectly, the experimenter went over the question and answer out loud for the beneﬁt of all
subjects (without identifying which subject had answered incorrectly). After any incorrect answers were
discussed, the ﬁrst round of play began. After the twentieth round of play was completed, each subject
was given a copy of the instructions for the remaining twenty rounds. These were also read aloud, after
which another (shorter) quiz was given out, before the ﬁnal twenty rounds were played.
In the instructions, we strove to use neutral terminology. Instead of relatively loaded terms such as
“opponent” or “partner”, we used phrases such as “the player matched with you”. Also, in our discussion
of recommendations, we never went so far as to instruct subjects to follow recommendations, or even to
point out that following recommendations might lead to higher payoﬀs; rather, we merely provided the
outcome distribution from which the recommendations were generated (both in the written instructions
and in our public reading of those instructions), and noted that a player’s recommendation may or may
not convey information about the recommendation given to the player matched with him.11
The experiment was run on networked computers, using the z–Tree experiment software package (Fis-
chbacher (2007)). Subjects were asked not to communicate directly with one another, so the only interac-
tions were via the computer program. Subjects were paired using a round–robin matching format, in an
attempt to minimize incentives for reputation building and other potential supergame eﬀects; for the same
reason, subjects were not given identifying information about their opponents in any round.
A round of the game in which there were no recommendations (either rounds 1–20 or rounds 21–40,
depending on the cell) began by prompting subjects to choose one of the two available actions. (In the
instructions and during the session, the actions were named X and Y instead of D and C, respectively.)
After the action choices were entered, each subject was shown the following information: own action,
opponent action, own payoﬀ, and opponent payoﬀ. In a round of the game with recommendations, the
sequence of play was similar except for the recommendations. Speciﬁcally, subjects would ﬁrst be shown
their “recommended action”, which was randomly drawn from the appropriate outcome distribution. Then,
they were prompted to choose an action. After action choices were entered, each subject was shown the
following information: own recommendation, own action, opponent recommendation, opponent action,
own payoﬀ, and opponent payoﬀ. In all treatments, subjects were not given information about the results
of any other pairs of subjects, either individually or in aggregate. At the end of the round, subjects were
10The set of instructions given to subjects—as well as additional materials given to them (quizzes and record sheets)—from
one of our cells can be found at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/˜pec214/papers/corr instructions.pdf. Materials used in the other
cells and screenshots of the computer interface seen by subjects, as well as the raw data from the experiment, are available
from the corresponding author upon request.
11One passage from our instructions states, “These recommendations are optional; it is up to you whether or not to
follow them. Notice that your recommendation may give you information about the recommendation that was given to the
person matched to you.” To further emphasize this point, one of the questions in the quiz given to subjects after reading
the instructions was, “You are required to follow the recommendations shown on your computer screen (circle one): TRUE
FALSE”—to which the correct answer was FALSE. We acknowledge the possibility that our use of the term “recommendations”
itself might have inﬂuenced subjects to follow them to some extent.
8asked to observe their result, write the information from that round down onto a record sheet, and then
click a button to continue to the next round.
At the end of round 40 of any treatment, the experimental session ended. One of the ﬁrst twenty rounds
and one of the last twenty rounds were randomly chosen, and each subject received his/her earnings from
these two rounds, at an exchange rate of $1 per point. Additionally, all subjects received a $5 show–up
fee. Total earnings for subjects participating in a session averaged about $15, and sessions typically lasted
between 45 and 60 minutes.
4 Experimental results
A total of 16 sessions were conducted—four of each treatment—with 12 subjects per session, for a total
of 192 subjects. Each subject played 20 rounds without recommendations and 20 with recommendations,
giving us 7580 observations overall: 1920 of each treatment. Aggregate outcome frequencies and payoﬀs
are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Aggregate observed outcome frequencies
Recommendations Ordering Outcome Average
(D,D) (D,C) (C,D) (C,C) payoﬀ
+ 0.145 0.200 0.274 0.381 5.513
None – 0.174 0.226 0.295 0.305 5.261
Combined 0.159 0.213 0.284 0.343 5.387
+ 0.154 0.258 0.363 0.225 5.300
Good – 0.125 0.258 0.279 0.338 5.588
Combined 0.140 0.258 0.321 0.281 5.444
+ 0.213 0.267 0.246 0.275 5.000
Bad – 0.171 0.242 0.208 0.379 5.354
Combined 0.192 0.254 0.227 0.327 5.177
+ 0.121 0.271 0.300 0.308 5.583
Nash – 0.104 0.258 0.300 0.338 5.713
Combined 0.113 0.265 0.300 0.323 5.648
+ 0.138 0.175 0.254 0.433 5.608
Very good – 0.200 0.279 0.229 0.292 5.092
Combined 0.169 0.227 0.242 0.363 5.350
Note: “+”: recommendations received in rounds 21–40; “–”: recom-
mendations received in rounds 1–20
4.1 Behavior without recommendations
We ﬁrst examine subject behavior in rounds where subjects do not receive recommendations; this is shown
in the top three rows of data in Table 2. There are minor, but insigniﬁcant, diﬀerences in aggregate choice
9frequencies according to whether the no–recommendation rounds were 1–20 or 21–40 (robust rank–order
test, session–level data, p > 0.10 for (C,C) frequencies, p > 0.20 for the other three frequencies).12 If
we pool (C,D) and (D,C) outcomes, aggregate behavior comes very close to the mixed–strategy Nash
equilibrium prediction of 16% (D,D) outcomes, 48% (C,D) and (D,C) outcomes, and 36% (C,C) outcomes.
When these outcomes are treated separately, however, the substantially larger frequency of (C,D) than
(D,C) outcomes means that mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium does less well. In fact, a chi–square test
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that behavior in the no–recommendations rounds is generated by i.i.d.
mixed–strategy equilibrium play (p < 0.001) when (C,D) and (D,C) outcomes are disaggregated, but not
when they are pooled (p > 0.20). We note that this test assumes independence across subjects in a session
and for each subject over time (so to the extent that these assumptions do not hold, the test will be
excessively liberal).
The reason for the partial failure of mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium to characterize play in this treat-
ment becomes clearer when we disaggregate the data further. Figure 4 shows the frequencies of C choices
by both types of player in the experiment, disaggregated into groups of sessions that had qualitatively
similar results, and also disaggregated into ﬁve–round blocks. The ﬁrst such ﬁve-round block in a session
is labeled in the ﬁgure (as “1–5”), and the path of play through the other three ﬁve–round blocks are
shown via line segments. In a plurality (7 out of 16) of sessions (numbers 1–4, 7, 13 and 15), behavior
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is close to the mixed–strategy prediction after the ﬁrst block of ﬁve rounds. In the other nine sessions,
behavior is not well described by mixed–strategy play, though the nature of the deviations varies. In three
sessions (5, 6, and 14), behavior starts out near the mixed–strategy outcome but moves over time toward
the pure–strategy outcome (C,D), while in three other sessions (8, 9, and 10), behavior starts and remains
between the mixed–strategy outcome and (C,D). In the remaining three sessions (11, 12, 16) average play is
also away from the mixed–strategy outcome, in the direction of the (D,C) pure–strategy outcome (though
12See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for descriptions of the nonparametric tests used in this paper. Critical values for the
robust rank–order test are from Feltovich (2005).
10it does not move in this direction over time).
While behavior in this no–recommendations treatment can be diﬀerent from i.i.d. mixed–strategy
equilibrium play, a weaker condition—statisticalindependence of row and column player choices—is broadly
satisﬁed. To verify this, we calculated the phi coeﬃcient of association (a measure of correlation for
categorical data) for each ﬁve–round block of every session, giving us 64 of these coeﬃcients. Of these 64,
only 6 (that is, 9.375% of them) were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level, and 4 (6.25% of the
64) were signiﬁcant at the 5% level: roughly what would be expected by chance if row and column player
choices are independent.
4.2 Eﬀect of recommendations on population aggregates
Having examined how subjects behave without recommendations, we next look at whether recommenda-
tions have any eﬀect. Table 2 above provides some strong evidence that they do.13 When recommendations
are generated from a correlated equilibrium (all but the very–good–recommendations treatment), outcome
frequencies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from mixed–strategy probabilities—irrespective of whether we pool
(C,D) and (D,C) outcomes—and the diﬀerence is in the direction predicted by correlated equilibrium (fol-
lowing recommendations). Both good recommendations and Nash recommendations increase the likelihood
of a pure–strategy Nash equilibrium outcome, from 49.7% without recommendations to 56.5% with Nash
recommendations and 57.9% with good recommendations, though this likelihood decreases slightly in the
game with bad recommendations—to 48.1%—and with very good recommendations, to the lowest fre-
quency of 46.9%. Also, the Pareto–dominated (D,D) outcome becomes more likely under bad or very good
recommendations (19.2% and 16.9% of the time respectively, versus 15.9% when no recommendations are
given) and less likely under good recommendations (14.0%) or Nash recommendations (11.3%). For some
of the treatments, this last result might be expected in light of the outcome probabilities we attempted to
impose: a 20% chance of (D,D) in the bad–recommendations treatment and 0% in the good– and Nash–
recommendations treatment as compared with 16% in the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. However,
this does not hold for the very–good–recommendations treatment, as the frequency of (D,D) recommended
outcomes was 0% in this treatment as well.
Two–sample chi–square tests imply that the distributions of outcomes in the good–, bad–, and Nash–
recommendations treatments are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the distribution without recommendations
(d.f. = 3, p < 0.02 for each comparison), but there is not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between no recommen-
dations and very–good recommendations (χ2 = 3.511, d.f. = 3, p > 0.20). The ﬁnding of no diﬀerence
between no recommendations and very good recommendations is striking: it suggests that subjects will
not blindly follow just any recommendations, but rather will follow them only if they are consistent with
implementation of a correlated equilibrium. Indeed, one–sample chi–square tests ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the distribution of outcomes in either the bad– or very–good–recommendations treatment
and that implied by mixed–strategy equilibrium play (χ2 = 5.188, d.f. = 3, p > 0.10 and χ2 = 0.577,
d.f. = 3, p > 0.20 respectively), while we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences from mixed–strategy equilibrium
for the good– and Nash–recommendations treatments (χ2 = 23.26, d.f. = 3, p < 0.001 and χ2 = 17.01,
13In the following discussion, we will concentrate on the pooled data from sessions with recommendations ﬁrst and sessions
with recommendations last. We will see in Table 4 and the surrounding discussion that pooling the data in this way is
justiﬁable.
11d.f. = 3, p < 0.001 respectively).14
Furthermore, we note that in the cases where recommendations were consistent with implementation
of a correlated equilibrium, aggregate outcome frequencies—while diﬀerent from the point predictions
of Table 1—typically move in the direction predicted by correlated equilibrium relative to the mixed–
strategy Nash equilibrium prediction. For example, if subjects were always to follow recommendations
in the good–, bad– and Nash–recommendations treatments, the resulting frequency of (C,C) outcomes
would be lower than in the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. As Table 2 shows, the frequencies of (C,C)
outcomes in these cases are indeed lower than in mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. By contrast, in the
very–good–recommendations case, if subjects followed recommendations, the predicted frequency of (D,D)
outcomes would be lower than in the mixed Nash equilibrium (0 versus 0.16), but Table 2 shows that
the observed frequency is actually higher. Finally, two–sample chi–square tests usually ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the distribution of outcomes between any two of the recommendations treatments (p > 0.10
for comparison of the good– and Nash–recommendations treatments and for comparison of the bad– and
very–good–recommendations treatments, p < 0.02 for any other pair of treatments).
Another way of assessing whether recommendations have any eﬀect involves testing for independence
between row and column player choices. Recall from Section 4.1 that players’ choices were found to be
independent of each other when players did not receive recommendations. We now construct the phi
coeﬃcient of association for each session and ﬁve–round block when recommendations are received by
subjects, giving us a total of 64 of these coeﬃcients—16 for each treatment. In the good–recommendations
treatment, 5 of the 16 ﬁve–round blocks have a signiﬁcantly negative correlation at the 10% level, and 3 of
these are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while in the Nash–recommendations treatment, 4 of 16 are negative
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (with the other 12 not signiﬁcant even at the 10% level). These proportions
are higher than chance would predict, giving additional evidence that recommendations are having an eﬀect
on behavior. In the bad– and very–good–recommendations treatment, on the other hand, only 2 and 1
(respectively) of 16 are negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better, suggesting that recommendations
have less eﬀect in these treatments. We note, however, that the level of correlation implied even by perfect
following of recommendations varies sharply across treatments, from perfect negative correlation in the
Nash–recommendations treatment, to fairly high (in absolute value) correlations of −2
3 and −1
2 in the
bad– and good–recommendations treatments respectively, to the nearly zero correlation of −1
9 in the very–
good–recommendations treatment. As a result, direct comparisons across treatments should be made with
caution.
Summarizing, we have:
Result 1 When no recommendations are given, aggregate outcome frequencies are broadly similar to
mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium frequencies, though in some sessions there is a tendency toward one of
the pure–strategy Nash equilibria. When recommendations are given, they lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
aggregate outcome frequencies, compared with the no–recommendations case, if and only if the recommen-
14As in the previous section, we note here that these chi–square statistics assume independence across subjects in a session
and for each subject over time. Also, note that observed frequencies in all treatments are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from any of
the correlated–equilibrium predictions, as each of the latter predicts zero probability of at least one outcome that occurs with
positive frequency in the experimental data. Finally, pooling (C,D) and (D,C) outcomes has little qualitative eﬀect on these
signiﬁcance tests; the lone exception is that outcomes in the bad–recommendations treatment are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
mixed–strategy equilibrium at the 10% level when these are pooled, but not when they are treated separately.
12dations come from a correlated equilibrium. Also, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in aggregate outcomes
across the treatments with recommendations. When recommendations come from a correlated equilibrium,
the eﬀect on aggregate outcome frequencies is consistent with the directional predictions—though usually
not the point predictions—of the corresponding correlated equilibrium.
Table 2 also shows the per–round average payoﬀ earned by subjects in each treatment; these vary from
a low of 4.902 under bad recommendations to a high of 5.648 under Nash recommendations. However, a
nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis one–way analysis of variance fails to reject the null hypothesis that average
payoﬀs are the same in all four recommendations treatments (session–level data, p > 0.10), and robust
rank–order tests ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in pairwise comparisons between treatments (session–level
data, p > 0.10 in all cases). This lack of signiﬁcance in the payoﬀ dimension is likely owing to the relatively
small diﬀerences in predicted expected payoﬀs amongst the various correlated equilibria, combined with
the inherent conservatism of nonparametric tests using session–level data.
4.3 Eﬀects of recommendations on individual behavior
Having shown that aggregate play with recommendations is usually diﬀerent from aggregate play without
recommendations—and that this diﬀerence depends on which recommendations are given—we next con-
sider how subjects treat the particular recommendations they receive. Table 3 shows the frequencies with
which recommendations are followed in each treatment over all twenty rounds as well as for the last ﬁve
rounds of each treatment (after subjects have had time to gain experience with the strategic environment).
For the sake of comparison, the table also shows the corresponding predicted frequencies according to
mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. (Note that the predictions in the last two columns depend on the actual
frequencies of C versus D recommendations given in the experiment, so these will vary across treatments
and rounds.15)
Here we see more diﬀerences across treatments. In the good– and Nash–recommendations treat-
ments, subjects are substantially more likely to follow recommendations than would be predicted by
the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. They follow D recommendations 73.5% of the time in the good–
recommendations treatment and 56.7% of the time in the Nash–recommendations treatment, compared to
a prediction of 40%, and they follow C recommendations 73.2% of the time in the good–recommendations
treatment and 77.7% of the time in the Nash–recommendations treatment, compared to a prediction of
60%. As the table shows, these frequencies are even higher if we concentrate on the last ﬁve rounds of the
treatment, and all of these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant (one–tailed sign test, session–level data, p = 0.0625).
In the bad– and very–good–recommendations treatments, evidence that subjects follow recommenda-
tions is weaker. If we look at frequencies for the entire bad–recommendations treatment, subjects are
15Speciﬁcally, the predictions in the third and fourth columns are based on the predictions of 0.4 and 0.6 for the frequencies of
following D and C recommendations (from the ﬁrst and second columns). For the third column—overall frequency of followed
recommendations—we take the mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium prediction in a treatment to be the weighted average of 0.4
and 0.6, with the weightings equal to the actual observed frequencies of D and C recommendations in that treatment. As
an example, in the good–recommendations treatment, C recommendations were actually made to subjects 628 times and D











0.531. In a similar way, the predictions for the fourth column (frequency of both paired players following recommendations)
are weighted averages of 0.16, 0.24, 0.24, and 0.36 (predictions conditional on recommended outcomes of (D,D), (D,C), (C,D),
and (C,C) respectively), weighted by the actual frequencies of recommendation pairs.
13Table 3: Frequencies of followed recommendations—all subjects, all rounds
Frequency of Frequency of Frequency of Frequency of
followed D followed C followed followed
Treatment recommendations recommendations recommendations recommendations
(overall) (pairs)
Observed (all rounds) 0.735∗ 0.732∗ 0.733∗ 0.531∗
Good Observed (rnds 16–20) 0.750∗ 0.770∗ 0.762∗ 0.583∗
Mixed NE prediction 0.400 0.600 0.531 0.277
Observed (all rounds) 0.477 0.631 0.541 0.269∗
Bad Observed (rnds 16–20) 0.529∗ 0.530 0.529∗ 0.300∗
Mixed NE prediction 0.400 0.600 0.483 0.226
Observed (all rounds) 0.567∗ 0.777∗ 0.672∗ 0.454∗
Nash Observed (rnds 16–20) 0.608∗ 0.792∗ 0.700∗ 0.517∗
Mixed NE prediction 0.400 0.600 0.500 0.240
Very Observed (all rounds) 0.511∗ 0.608 0.599 0.381
good Observed (rnds 16–20) 0.227 0.537 0.508 0.308
Mixed NE prediction 0.400 0.600 0.580 0.336
*: Signiﬁcantly above corresponding mixed–strategy prediction (one–tailed sign test, session–level data, p = 0.0625)
not signiﬁcantly more likely to follow either type of recommendation than predicted by mixed–strategy
equilibrium (one–tailed sign test, session–level data, p > 0.10), though the frequencies are slightly higher
than predicted (47.7% for D recommendations and 63.1% for C recommendations, versus predictions of
40% and 60%). However, if we focus on the last ﬁve rounds, we ﬁnd a higher frequency of following D
recommendations, and this frequency is signiﬁcantly higher than the mixed–strategy equilibrium prediction
(p = 0.0625), though we also see that subjects actually become less likely to follow C recommendations
in the last ﬁve rounds. Subjects in the very–good–recommendations treatment are not signiﬁcantly more
likely to follow C recommendations than mixed–strategy equilibrium predicts (p > 0.10), either over all
rounds or in the last ﬁve. They are more likely to follow D recommendations over all rounds (51.1% versus
a predicted 40%), and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (p = 0.0625), but this frequency drops sharply in the last
ﬁve rounds to below one–fourth, and in those rounds is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mixed–strategy
equilibrium prediction (p > 0.10).
Given how these results vary with the treatment, it should not be surprising that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences across treatments in how often recommendations are followed. A Kruskal–Wallis one–way
analysis of variance rejects the null hypothesis that the likelihood of following a C recommendation is the
same across the four treatments (p < 0.05), and similarly for the case of a D recommendation (p < 0.05).
The null of equal frequencies across treatments of following recommendations overall is also rejected (p <
0.05), but we should note that mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium does not imply equal frequencies in this
case.
We next examine how subjects’ willingness to follow recommendations changes over time. Figure 5
shows the frequency with which recommendations are followed in each ﬁve–round block, disaggregated
according to which correlated equilibrium was being implemented, and which action was recommended.
14For C recommendations, there are no obvious time trends in the good– and Nash–recommendations treat-
Figure 5: Frequency of followed recommendations









































ments, while subjects in the bad– and very–good–recommendations treatments become less likely over time
to follow these (falling from about 75% to just over 50% in both). The frequency of following D recommen-
dations stays roughly constant over time in the good–recommendations treatment and rises slightly in the
bad– and Nash–recommendations treatment. In the very–good–recommendations treatment, sample sizes
for D recommendations are small (since only one–tenth of recommendations is for a D choice), but their
frequency of being followed rises somewhat from the ﬁrst to the third ﬁve–round block, before plummeting
in the last ﬁve–round block.
Further evidence of the eﬀects of recommendations on individual subject choices can be found in Ta-
ble 4, which reports the results of several probit regressions with the subject’s choice of action as the
dependent variable. (To be precise, the dependent variable is an indicator for a C choice.) Our main inde-
pendent variables are two indicators for recommendations given to subjects—one for a C recommendation
(viz., taking on the value of one if a C recommendation was made, and zero otherwise) and one for a D
recommendation. (To avoid perfect collinearity, we do not include an indicator for no recommendation.)
We also include variables for the products of these indicators with the round number, to capture any time–
varying eﬀect of recommendations that exists. Additionally, we include a variable for the round number
itself, as well as an indicator variable that takes the value one in sessions in which recommendations were
given in the ﬁrst twenty rounds rather than the last twenty (to capture any order eﬀects).
The regressions were performed using Stata (version 10) and incorporate individual–subject random
eﬀects; we estimate coeﬃcients separately for the four treatments. The results are shown in Table 4, which
shows the coeﬃcient and standard error for each variable in our four model speciﬁcations. (We additionally
estimated speciﬁcations with individual–session ﬁxed eﬀects, but the results were nearly identical to those
reported here.) Also shown is the absolute value of the log–likelihood, as well as a pseudo–R2, for each
model speciﬁcation.
We do not ﬁnd evidence of substantial order eﬀects between treatments (that is, our results are robust
to whether the rounds with recommendations came before or after the rounds without recommendations),
15Table 4: Results of probit regressions with random eﬀects (standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Good–recommendations Bad–recommendations Nash–recommendations Very–good–
cooperative action treatment (N = 1920) treatment (N = 1920) treatment (N = 1920) recommendations
chosen in round t treatment (N = 1920)
constant 0.372 0.464 0.727∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.295) (0.250) (0.241)
Order (indicator 0.046 0.232 –0.097 –0.440
for order eﬀects) (0.312) (0.392) (0.327) (0.314)
t (round number) 0.001 −0.022∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Drec (D recom– −1.098∗∗∗ –0.075 −0.463∗∗∗ −1.313∗∗∗
mendation given) (0.207) (0.181) (0.172) (0.299)
Drec · t –0.001 −0.022∗∗∗ –0.009 0.088∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025)
Crec (C recom– 0.593∗∗∗ 0.338∗ 0.472∗∗ 0.086
mendation given) (0.162) (0.200) (0.184) (0.150)
Crec · t –0.014 –0.021 0.021 0.002
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
–ln(L) 970.789 898.429 950.705 971.544
pseudo–R2 0.106 0.027 0.086 0.037
* (**,***): Coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
as the “Order” variable is never signiﬁcant. On the other hand, there is some nonstationarity in the data,
as shown by the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the round number t in three of the four treatments
(the lone exception being the good–recommendations treatment). The signiﬁcance of the recommendation
variables varies substantially across treatments. In the good and Nash–recommendations treatments, the
C–recommendations and D–recommendations indicators are both signiﬁcant, but their products with the
round number are not, and each has the sign associated with subjects’ following recommendations: positive
for C and negative for D. In the bad–recommendations treatment, the D–recommendations indicator is
insigniﬁcant, but its product with the round number is signiﬁcant; the coeﬃcient of the C–recommendations
indicator is barely signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while that of its product with the round number is
insigniﬁcant. In the very–good–recommendations treatment, both the C–recommendations indicator and
its product with the round number are signiﬁcant, with the former negative and the latter positive, but
neither of the D–recommendations variables are signiﬁcant.
Based on these results, we conclude:
Result 2 There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across treatments in how subjects use their recommendations.
Subjects are most likely to follow recommendations in the good– and Nash–recommendations treatments.
In the bad–recommendations treatment, recommendations have less eﬀect on behavior. In the very–good–
recommendations treatment, subjects either don’t follow recommendations at all, or learn over time not to
follow them.
We next consider whether the likelihood of a subject following recommendations depends on the sub-
ject’s past history. One possibility is that subjects will be more willing to follow recommendations if
following them has been successful in the past. As a ﬁrst step, we look at how a subject’s propensity to
follow recommendations is aﬀected by the success of following recommendations in the previous round.
Speciﬁcally, we consider how consistent behavior in our experiment is with Selten and Stoecker’s (1986)
16“direction learning theory”. When a game has a one–dimensional strategy space, direction learning theory
predicts that when a player changes strategy from one round to the next, the change will be in the direction
of the (myopic) best response. In our setup, this implies that when a subject chose successfully (i.e., chose
a best response to the opponent’s action) in the previous round, she will continue following recommenda-
tions in the current round if she had done so in the previous round, or will not follow recommendations
in the current round if she did not follow them in the previous round. On the other hand, if the subject
chose unsuccessfully in the previous round, she will do the opposite of what she did in that round—follow
recommendations if she had not done so, or not follow recommendations if she had. By and large, our data
are only weakly consistent with direction learning. After a successful choice, subjects stay with the same
strategy (follow or not follow recommendations) 64.6% of the time, but they stay with the same strategy
almost as often (60.6% of the time) following an unsuccessful choice.
An alternative possibility is that subjects’ choices depend not just on the previous round outcome,
but instead on the entire history of play. To examine this possibility, we ﬁrst construct measures for the
success rate of following recommendations and that of not following recommendations. The success rate of
following recommendations is set to one–half if a subject has never followed a recommendation; otherwise,
it is equal to the proportion of times (in all rounds up through the previous round) in which following
recommendations led to a best response to the opponent action. (For example, if a player has thus far
followed recommendations 5 times, and 3 of these turned out to be best responses, then the success rate
would be 0.6.) The success rate of not following recommendations is calculated in an analogous way.
We then use the diﬀerence between these success rates (the rate for following recommendations minus
the one for not following recommendations) as an explanatory variable, where the dependent variable is
an indicator for following recommendations in the current round. The results can be seen in Table 5.
This table shows four alternative probit speciﬁcations, diﬀering in which other explanatory variables are
Table 5: Results of probit regressions with random eﬀects, rounds 2–20 of treatmentswith recommendations
(standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Model Model Model Model
follow recommendations speciﬁcation speciﬁcation speciﬁcation speciﬁcation
in round t (N = 3648) #1 #2 #3 #4
constant 0.381∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.066) (0.093) (0.105)
t (round number) –0.006 –0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Success–rate 0.196∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.161∗∗
diﬀerence (0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081)
Good recommendations 0.357∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134)
Bad recommendations –0.194 –0.198
(0.131) (0.130)
Nash recommendations 0.200 0.194
(0.135) (0.135)
–ln(L) 2226.897 2225.886 2217.141 2216.220
pseudo–R2 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.006
* (**,***): Coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
included: the round number, indicators for the treatments, or both. For all of these speciﬁcations, the
coeﬃcient for the success–rate diﬀerence is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that subjects are indeed
17more likely to follow recommendations, the more successful following them has been in the past—relative
to not following them. (On the other hand, the low pseudo–R2 values suggest that past success is only a
minor factor in explaining whether recommendations are followed.)
We thus have
Result 3 Subjects’ following of recommendations is aﬀected by history. The more successful following
recommendations has been in the past, or the less successful not following recommendations has been, the
more likely a subject is to follow recommendations in the current round.
We next look at whether subjects who fail to follow recommendations suﬀer (monetarily) as a result.
To examine this question, we consider subjects’ forgone payoﬀs: the payoﬀ a subject would have gotten
from choosing the other action, minus the payoﬀ the subject actually got. (Thus, a negative forgone payoﬀ
means the subject chose a best response.)
Overall, in rounds with no recommendations, forgone payoﬀs averaged –0.079 points per round, which is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (two–tailed Wilcoxon signed–ranks test, session–level data, p ≈ 0.40),
meaning that on average, subjects earned approximately the same payoﬀs with the actions they chose than
they would have earned by choosing the opposite action—as would be implied by mixed–strategy equilib-
rium play. Forgone payoﬀs averaged –0.467 points per round in the good–recommendations treatment and
–0.428 points per round in the Nash–recommendations treatment, both of which are signiﬁcantly less than
zero (one–tailed Wilcoxon test, session–level data, p = 0.0625 for both), while forgone payoﬀs averaged
+0.026 points per round in rounds with the bad–recommendations treatment and +0.059 points per round
in the very–good–recommendations treatment, neither of which is signiﬁcantly less than zero (p = 0.3125
and p = 0.6825 respectively), suggesting that subjects in the good– and Nash–recommendations treat-
ments by and large made correct choices, while subjects in the other two treatments did not. Since the
good– and Nash–recommendations treatments were also the ones where subjects were most likely to follow
recommendations, the implication is that following recommendations is indeed positively associated with
better outcomes for the individual subject, at least on average.
However, we are interested less in these treatment–wide aggregates than in how forgone payoﬀs are
associated with how often subjects followed the recommendations they were given. In Figure 6, we present
scatterplots showing, for each individual subject, the proportion of recommendations that were followed
(on the horizontal axis) and the subject’s mean forgone payoﬀ (on the vertical axis). Also shown are
two lines for each scatterplot: one is a least–squares line showing the actual average relationship between
following recommendations and foregone payoﬀs (with the slope shown as well), and the other is a bench-
mark line showing what this relationship would be under the assumption that the opposing player always
follows recommendations.16 The benchmark line is negatively sloped for the three treatments in which
recommendations form a correlated equilibrium, reﬂecting the incentives in these treatments for players
to follow recommendations as long as their opponents are expected to do so. In contrast, if opponents
always follow recommendations in the very–good–recommendations treatment, the incentives are against
following recommendations, as evidenced by the positive slope of that benchmark line.
16This benchmark makes the additional assumptions that (1) the player receives C and D recommendations in proportion
equal to the underlying probabilities of C and D recommendations in that treatment, and (2) the player’s likelihoods of
following C and D recommendations are equal.
18Figure 6: Relationship between followed recommendations and
forgone payoﬀs (Individual subjects, all rounds)
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For subjects in the good– and Nash–recommendations treatments, the least–squares line shows a visible
negative correlation between following recommendations and forgone payoﬀs, suggesting that following
recommendations more often was associated with better payoﬀs for individual subjects in these treatments,
as was true for the benchmark line. The least–squares lines are less steep in these treatments than the
benchmark lines, due to not all opponents following recommendations in reality (while we’ve assumed
they do for the benchmark). On the other hand, the least–squares line shows no apparent correlation for
subjects in the bad– and very–good–recommendations treatments, by contrast with the benchmark lines.
The implication is that in these two treatments, enough other subjects do not follow recommendations to
remove nearly all incentives to follow recommendations in the bad–recommendations treatment, or not to
follow recommendations in the very–good–recommendations treatment.
Spearman rank–order correlation tests provide further, quantitative, evidence of these results. The
Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between frequency of followed recommendations and mean forgone payoﬀ
is approximately –0.312 in the good–recommendations treatment and –0.469 in the Nash–recommendations
treatment, both of which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p ≈ 0.02 for the former and p < 0.001 for
the latter), suggesting that following recommendations more often was associated with better payoﬀs for
individual subjects. In the bad– and very–good–recommendations treatments, on the other hand, the
19Spearman coeﬃcients are approximately +0.003 and +0.092 respectively, neither of which is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (p ≈ 0.98 and p ≈ 0.25, respectively), suggesting that subjects in these treatments
did not do better by following recommendations than by ignoring them. The least–squares lines give
additional evidence of these relationships; their slopes are negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in
the good– and Nash–recommendations treatments (p < 0.01 for both treatments, using robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering by session), and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the bad– and
very–good–recommendations treatments (p > 0.20 for both treatments).
Finally, disaggregating by round and according to the recommended action tells a more detailed, but
similar, story. Linear panel–data regressions with individual–subject random eﬀects, either with or with-
out session ﬁxed eﬀects, show that a subject’s following either type of recommendation in either the
good–recommendations treatment or the Nash–recommendations treatment is associated with signiﬁcant
decreases in forgone payoﬀs, as is following a C recommendation in the bad–recommendations treatment.
By contrast, there is no signiﬁcant association between forgone payoﬀs and either following D recom-
mendations in the bad–recommendations treatment or following C recommendations in the very–good–
recommendations treatment. Finally, following D recommendations in the very–good–recommendations
treatment is positively correlated with foregone payoﬀs; that is, following D recommendations actually
lowers a player’s payoﬀ in that treatment.17
We thus conclude:
Result 4 In the good and Nash–recommendations treatments, it pays subjects (individually) to follow
either type of recommendation. In the bad–recommendations treatment, it pays subjects to follow C recom-
mendations, but there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between following D recommendations and
payoﬀs. In the very–good–recommendations treatment, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between following
C recommendations and payoﬀs, and it pays subjects not to follow D recommendations.
5 Summary and discussion
The aim of this paper was to assess the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important gen-
eralization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Speciﬁcally, we have explored whether subjects make use
of known (and publicly announced) distributions of private third–party recommendations as a coordina-
tion device in the game of Chicken, the simplest game with which to study a wide variety of correlated
equilibria. The treatments in our experiment diﬀer in the distributions of recommendations. Three of
our four treatments use distributions that form correlated equilibria; two of these yield symmetric payoﬀs
that are outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors. In our “good” correlated equilibrium,
payoﬀs are better than any symmetric payoﬀ in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors, while
in our “bad” correlated equilibrium, payoﬀs are worse than any symmetric payoﬀ in the convex hull of
17These regressions used the subset of the data in which recommendations were given. The dependent variable is forgone
payoﬀ, and the independent variables are C recommendation, D recommendation, followed C recommendation, followed D
recommendation. No constant term was used. In the results, p–values were below 0.001 for both types of recommendation in
the good– and Nash–recommendations treatment, approximately 0.043 for C recommendations in the bad–recommendations
treatment, and approximately 0.77 for D recommendations in the bad–recommendations treatment. In the very–good–
recommendations treatment, the p–value was approximately 0.78 for C recommendations and 0.030 for D recommendations,
but the coeﬃcient for the latter was positive. Adding session ﬁxed eﬀects to these regressions had little qualitative eﬀect.
20Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors. A third, “Nash” treatment uses a correlated equilibrium with payoﬀs in
the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors, and a fourth, “very good” treatment uses an outcome
distribution yielding high payoﬀs, but which is not a correlated equilibrium.
We ﬁnd that when subjects do not receive recommendations, their choices can be described fairly
well (though not perfectly) by mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium. This result suggests that theoretical
rationales for correlated equilibria that do not rely on extrinsic, third–party recommendations (or some
other “external event space” in the terminology of Vanderschraaf (2001)) might be diﬃcult to observe in
practice—though we acknowledge the possibility that if subjects had interacted in ﬁxed pairings rather
than under the random matching protocol we adopted, or had opportunities for communication (as in
Moreno and Wooders (1998)), then spontaneously–arising correlated equilibrium might have been more
likely to have been observed.
By contrast, giving subjects recommendations nearly always has an eﬀect on behavior, but the eﬀect
depends on what recommendations are given. When recommendations are based on an underlying corre-
lated equilibrium, subjects follow them more often than mixed–strategy equilibrium predicts, though far
less than 100% of the time, and varying with the correlated equilibrium. When recommendations are not
based on a correlated equilibrium, subjects learn to ignore them.
As in previous eﬀorts to implement correlated equilibria in the laboratory, our results cast a bit of
doubt on the usefulness of this solution concept as a descriptive notion, as the correlated equilibrium
point predictions are not observed. On the other hand, our study reveals several new and important
empirical ﬁndings about the correlated equilibrium concept. First, the lesson of our good– and Nash–
recommendations treatments is that it is not necessary for recommendations always to be followed in order
for them to have an eﬀect. Recommendations in these treatments were followed only roughly 70–75% of the
time, but this was enough to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the distribution of outcomes.18 (There was also a
positive, but insigniﬁcant, eﬀect on average payoﬀs.) Second, the lesson of our very–good–recommendations
treatment is that correlated equilibrium is likely a necessary condition for recommendations to have any
substantial eﬀect on behavior. In particular, we found that, consistent with the theoretical prediction,
subjects were not blindly following recommendations in the very–good-recommendations treatment (as
they would have if they were, for example, simply trying to please the experimenters, or choosing high–
payoﬀ outcomes irrespective of the outcomes’ strategic properties). Third, our bad–recommendations
treatment shows that it is particularly diﬃcult to induce subjects to follow recommendations based on
correlated equilibria that are Pareto inferior to the available Nash equilibria. This ﬁnding would seem to
greatly limit the class of empirically relevant correlated equilibria to those that Pareto improve upon the
set of Nash equilibria.19
Future theoretical and empirical work on the topic of correlated equilibria might relax the assumption
18This frequency is comparable to that found by Cason and Sharma (2007), whose baseline treatment resembles our good–
recommendations treatment. Unlike Cason and Sharma, we do not attempt here to disentangle among competing explanations
for subjects’ failure to follow recommendations (see Note 8), such as social preferences, uncertainty about whether the opponent
will follow recommendations, or simply decision errors; however, we expect that their ﬁnding—that all three of these factors
have some impact—should apply to our subjects as well.
19A referee has pointed out an alternative explanation for our results: that recommendations are more likely to be followed
when the underlying outcome distribution allows easy application of Bayes’s rule. Posterior probabilities in the good– and








9 in the very–good–recommendations treatment; the increased cognitive requirements involved in calculating expected
payoﬀs using these latter fractions might have pushed frequencies of following recommendations toward one–half.
21that recommendations arise from a non–strategic third party according to deterministic (and commonly
known) probabilities. In place of this construct, a self–interested “mediator” player might repeatedly choose
recommendations to make to the players of the stage game. In such an environment, the mediator’s payoﬀ
could be based on the payoﬀs earned by the stage–game players: for example, it might be proportional
to their average payoﬀ. In this setting, the researcher could explore whether the mediator’s frequencies of
recommendations to players were consistent with any correlated equilibrium, and if so, which one: good,
bad, Nash, or some other one.20
A second useful extension would be to consider some “language” issues as they apply to correlated
equilibrium. For instance, one might wonder whether the form of recommendations matters: for example,
whether subjects are told, “It is recommended that you play C”, as in our design, or they simply see the
message “C” on their screens. The salience and literal meanings of recommendations are also of interest:
must the message space for recommendations correspond precisely to the action space, or might it be larger
(for example, including also “no message”), or consist of a set of messages with no clear mapping to the
action space (such as the message space {@, & })?21
We leave these extensions to future research.
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